Encryption and identity

What is a device key?

A device key is a cryptographic key pair created on one device and used to identify that device and to sign or decrypt on its behalf. The private half stays on the device, ideally in platform key storage that will not export it, while the public half is shared with others. It identifies a device, not a person, so an application still has to link it to an account and decide what it is allowed to do.

TL;DR

Give each device its own signing and key agreement key pairs, with private halves in storage that will not export them. Secure Enclave and StrongBox limit elliptic curves to P-256, so Ed25519 and X25519 keys go in other protected storage such as the keychain. A device key proves possession, not identity or permission, and it can survive an iOS uninstall.

Learning objectives

After reading this article you will be able to:

  • Explain why each device holds its own key pair and what it is used for
  • Describe how Android Keystore, the Apple keychain and the Secure Enclave protect private keys
  • Distinguish what a device key signature proves from enrolment and authorisation

Device keys vs person and account keys

A device key is a key pair that belongs to one device rather than to a person or an account. Each phone, laptop or sensor generates its own pair, keeps the private half and shares the public half. A person with several devices has several device keys.

The Messaging Layer Security standard, MLS (RFC 9420), is built around this idea. It defines a client as an agent that takes part in the protocol and says a client is defined by the cryptographic keys it holds. It also notes that if a user has several devices in a group, each device’s client could present the same user-level identifier. The protocol tracks devices; the application decides which devices belong to which person.

Keeping keys per device means a private key never has to be copied between devices, and removing one device means removing one key rather than replacing a key that every other device shares.

Device keys for signing and key agreement

A device usually needs keys for two different jobs, signing and key agreement:

  • Signing. The device signs what it sends, for example with Ed25519, so others can check it came from that device and was not changed. In MLS, each message carries a signature from the sender’s signature key.
  • Key agreement and decryption. Others use the device’s public key to set up encryption to it. An MLS key package, for example, carries a public key that other clients use to encrypt to that client.

NIST’s key management guidance says that, in general, a single key shall be used for only one purpose, because using one key for two processes may weaken both and because limiting a key’s use limits the damage if it is compromised. So what people call a device key may in practice be a small set of keys, for example a long-lived identity key for signing plus separate keys for key agreement. Some systems also derive the device’s address from its public key, which makes it a self-certifying identifier.

Device private key storage on phones

Phones offer storage designed to keep private keys from leaving the device: Android Keystore, and the Apple keychain and Secure Enclave.

Android Keystore. Android’s documentation says key material in the Keystore remains non-exportable and never enters the app’s process; the app sends data to a system process that performs the operation. Keys can be bound to secure hardware, such as a Trusted Execution Environment or a Secure Element, in which case the key material is never exposed outside that hardware. Apps can also restrict a key to certain algorithms and purposes, a validity period, or recent user authentication.

Apple keychain and Secure Enclave. Apple describes the keychain as encrypting key data on disk and making it available only to your app or apps you authorise, but notes that using a keychain key means briefly copying a plain-text version into memory. The Secure Enclave goes further: the app never handles the plain-text key and receives only the results of operations.

The strongest options have limits. Apple says the Secure Enclave works only with NIST P-256 elliptic curve keys and cannot take in keys created elsewhere. Android’s StrongBox supports a listed subset of algorithms whose elliptic curve entries are ECDSA and ECDH on P-256. An app that uses Ed25519 or X25519 device keys therefore cannot create them inside the Secure Enclave or StrongBox, and keeps them in other protected storage, such as the keychain.

Device key guarantees and limits

A valid signature from a device key shows that the signer held that private key. It does not show who was holding the phone, or what they are allowed to do. Those need separate steps:

  • Enrolment. To link a device to an existing account, a server can issue a fresh random challenge, have the device sign it, verify the signature and store the binding.
  • Authorisation. The application decides what an enrolled device may do. Proving possession of a key grants no permissions by itself.
  • User presence. Where it matters, the key can be configured so that it works only after the user authenticates, which both Android Keystore and the Secure Enclave support.

MLS’s security considerations show why enrolment deserves care. A compromised authentication service could add a key under a user’s name as if it were a new device for that user, and the RFC suggests schemes in which a user’s devices vouch for each other by signing each other’s keys.

Device keys after reinstall or loss

A device key is meant to persist across app restarts, and it can outlive the app itself. Offline Protocol’s security documentation notes that on iOS, keychain identity state survives an app uninstall unless it is explicitly wiped, so reinstalling is not an identity reset. Account deletion should remove the key on purpose.

When a device is lost, its key should be removed from every group and account it belongs to, and keys it shared with others should be replaced. Key rotation covers the replacement side, and what happens when a phone holding keys is lost covers the response as a whole.

Frequently asked questions

Can a device key be copied to a new phone?

Not if it was created in non-exportable storage. Android Keystore keys can be bound to secure hardware that never exposes them, and Apple's Secure Enclave has no mechanism to move plain-text key data in or out. A new phone normally gets a new device key, which the account then has to enrol.

Does reinstalling an iOS app reset its device key?

No. Offline Protocol's security documentation notes that on iOS, keychain identity state survives an app uninstall unless it is explicitly wiped, so account deletion should remove the key on purpose.

Can the Secure Enclave store Ed25519 keys?

No. Apple says the Secure Enclave works only with NIST P-256 elliptic curve keys and cannot take in keys created elsewhere, so an app that uses Ed25519 or X25519 device keys keeps them in other protected storage, such as the keychain.

How do you link a device key to an existing account?

A server can issue a fresh random challenge, have the device sign it, verify the signature and store the binding. Proving possession of the key grants no permissions by itself, so the application still decides what the enrolled device may do.

Should one device key be used for both signing and encryption?

Usually not. NIST's key management guidance says that, in general, a single key shall be used for only one purpose, so a device key is often a small set of keys, such as a long-lived identity key for signing plus separate keys for key agreement.

Does a device key identify the person using the phone?

No. A valid signature from a device key shows that the signer held that private key, not who was holding the phone. MLS tracks devices as clients, and the application decides which devices belong to which person.

Sources

Build it with Offline Protocol

The device identity guide explains how each device's Ed25519 identity key and address relate, how to bind a device key to an existing account by verifying a signature over a fresh nonce, and how to wipe identity state deliberately.

Read the device identity guide