Key points
A plastic license is checked by looking at it. An mDL is checked by verifying signatures, which is why it can be checked with no network: a signature check is local arithmetic, provided the reader already trusts the right keys. ISO/IEC 18013-5 standardises that exchange between the holder’s phone and the verifier’s reader, and AAMVA’s implementation guidelines describe how North American issuing authorities apply it.
AAMVA puts the purpose in two conditions: the verifier can confirm that the mDL was issued by a bona fide issuing authority, and that its information has not changed since the issuing authority created it. Offline verification meets both without contacting the issuer.
mDL phone-to-reader connection
The phone and the reader make first contact by QR code or NFC tap, then open an encrypted channel over Bluetooth LE, NFC or Wi-Fi Aware. ISO/IEC 18013-5 splits this into two steps.
Device engagement. The reader scans a QR code on the holder’s phone, or the two touch over NFC. Google’s guide describes this step as exchanging engagement metadata and an ephemeral public key. The ISO working draft explains why it matters: the encryption key for the session is derived from ephemeral key pairs on both sides, and the phone’s key is shared only through this short-range engagement, so data can only go to the reader that was physically present.
Data retrieval. The devices then connect directly. The second-edition committee draft published by the ISO working group lists the options:
| Data retrieval method | Transport | mDL (phone) | mDL reader |
|---|---|---|---|
| Device retrieval | Bluetooth LE | Conditional: BLE, NFC or both | Mandatory |
| Device retrieval | NFC | Conditional: BLE, NFC or both | Mandatory |
| Device retrieval | Wi-Fi Aware | Optional | Recommended |
| Server retrieval | WebAPI or OpenID Connect | Optional | Recommended |
A phone must support device retrieval over BLE, NFC or both, so a reader that supports both can always reach it. For BLE, the reader must support both the central and peripheral modes the standard defines. The draft is explicit that device retrieval needs no internet connection on any device involved.
mDL reader checks
An mDL reader checks four things, according to Google’s guide to in-person verification: the issuer’s signature, the validity window, the integrity of each returned data element, and device authentication. The ISO draft lists the security mechanisms that sit behind them for device retrieval.
| Check | What the reader verifies | Against what | What it stops |
|---|---|---|---|
| Session encryption | The channel is encrypted with keys from both sides’ ephemeral key pairs | The key shared during engagement | Eavesdropping, and data going to a reader that was not there |
| Issuer data authentication | The issuer’s signature over the Mobile Security Object (MSO) | Issuing authority certificates the reader already trusts | Forged data, or data from an unknown issuer |
| Data integrity | Each returned element hashes to the digest listed in the signed MSO | The MSO’s value digests | Altered or substituted elements |
| Validity | The MSO’s validity period covers the current time | The reader’s own clock | Data that is out of date |
| mdoc authentication | A signature or MAC from the device key, computed over the session transcript | The device public key the issuer signed into the MSO | Cloned data, replay, and man-in-the-middle relays |
| mdoc reader authentication (optional) | The reader’s certificate and signature | Certificate authorities the mDL trusts | Data released to an unidentified reader |
The design means the reader never has to trust the phone’s software. AAMVA gives the reason the standard does not let the phone compute facts such as age itself: the verifier would then have to trust the device, whereas as it stands the verifier needs to trust only the issuing authority’s public key.
Issuing authority trust for mDL readers
The reader confirms the data came from the issuing authority by checking the issuer’s signature against a root certificate it loaded before the transaction. Google’s guide describes the reader validating the signed MSO against trusted Issuing Authority CA (IACA) root certificates held in a local trust store.
Getting those roots is the one step that needs a connection, and it does not have to happen at transaction time. AAMVA describes ISO/IEC 18013-5’s Verified Issuer Certificate Authority List (VICAL): a provider collects issuing authorities’ public keys, confirms the authorities manage their keys securely, and publishes them as one signed list. In North America, AAMVA’s Digital Trust Service acts as that provider and removes keys when a solution stops meeting requirements. Google’s guide points US readers to the AAMVA VICAL service.
This is the same pattern as any issuer-signed credential: the issuer does its work online, and the verifier checks the result later without contacting it. Whether you need a certificate authority offline covers the general case.
mDL copy and replay protection
An mDL resists copying and replay because the phone proves it holds a private key that the issuer bound to this mDL, and signs over this session. The ISO draft calls this mdoc authentication: the mDL produces a signature or message authentication code over session data, using a private key stored only in the mDL, whose public key the issuing authority signed into the MSO.
Because the signature covers the session transcript, which includes the reader’s ephemeral key, a response recorded in one session fails in another. Google’s guide says this prevents replay and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the ISO draft notes that the reader can detect a man in the middle by validating that signature. How well this resists cloning depends on how well the phone protects the key; AAMVA requires private key material to be held in a security module designed for safekeeping keys.
It is the mDL form of challenge-response authentication. It also explains why a screenshot is useless: AAMVA says a visual rendering of a license on a phone does not qualify as an mDL and can be misused as a “flash pass”.
mDL selective disclosure
In an mDL exchange, the reader asks for specific data elements, and the holder decides which of them to release. AAMVA separates two measures:
- Data minimisation. The issuer records partial versions of an attribute, such as birth year alongside full date of birth, so the holder can share less.
- Selective data release. The holder chooses which requested fields go to the verifier, and the app must show clearly what was requested and whether the verifier intends to keep it.
Google’s guide gives the common case: request only age_over_21 rather than the full birth date when checking age. One rule cuts the other way. ISO/IEC 18013-5 requires the portrait to be shared if it was requested and any other element is released, so the verifier can tie the data to the person in front of them.
mDL reader authentication
The holder can check who is reading their mDL if the reader uses mdoc reader authentication, which is optional for device retrieval. The reader signs its request with a certificate, and the ISO draft notes this lets the mDL detect a man in the middle before returning any data. Google’s guide says Google Wallet can then show the user the verified reader’s identity.
AAMVA limits how far an mDL can insist on it: an mDL may require reader authentication before releasing elements outside AAMVA’s mandatory set, but must not require it for the mandatory elements.
Limits of offline mDL checks
An offline mDL check cannot tell you about anything that changed after the signed data was issued, and it does not match the person to the data for you.
- Revocation since issue. AAMVA lists three ways to revoke an mDL: a revocation list that revokes an MSO, pushing an update to the phone, and letting the MSO validity period run out when a push is not possible. An offline reader only knows what its last download of revocation data told it. The second-edition committee draft adds an optional status reference in the MSO pointing to a signed revocation list, as an identifier list or a status list, and says checking it is optional for the reader.
- Freshness. The MSO has its own validity period, separate from the license. AAMVA notes the legal credential often runs 5 to 7 years, says the mDL information may be outdated until the MSO expires, and recommends an MSO validity period of no more than 30 days.
- The clock. The validity check is only as good as the reader’s own clock.
- The person. In the post-matched transactions that ISO/IEC 18013-5 supports, the verifier compares the portrait with the person presenting the mDL.
These are the general limits of revoking access when devices are offline, applied to a driver’s license.
Server retrieval and online mDL presentation
Server retrieval and online presentation are the alternatives to device retrieval, and AAMVA allows only the second. With server retrieval, sometimes called the online model, the reader receives a token from the phone and fetches the data in real time from the issuing authority. ISO/IEC 18013-5 allows it, but AAMVA’s guidelines have prohibited it since version 1.5 of April 2025, citing their prohibition on tracking.
Presenting an mDL to a website is a separate standard, ISO/IEC 18013-7. AAMVA’s version 1.6 notes that its second edition has three protocols for presentation over the internet, including one based on OpenID for Verifiable Presentations and one using a browser API such as the W3C Digital Credentials API. NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence published a draft practice guide in March 2026, SP 1800-42, on using mDLs online for customer identification at financial institutions.
Offline Protocol’s role in mDL checks
Offline Protocol is not an mDL implementation. It does not issue, hold or read mdocs, it does not implement ISO/IEC 18013-5 or 18013-7, and it is not a verifier app.
The pattern an mDL uses, keys arranged in advance, a short-range link and a signature bound to a fresh exchange, is the one the SDK applies to devices rather than documents. Each device holds an Ed25519 identity key and derives its off1 address from it, so two devices can verify each other’s keys over Bluetooth LE or a local network with no server. As the security docs put it, that verification binds a key to an address and does not establish a person’s role or permissions; to tie a device to an existing account, a backend verifies the device’s signature over a fresh server-issued nonce, and OfflineID can then issue an Ed25519-signed credential for that binding. The device-to-device authentication guide shows the flow.